By 1951, the law of negligence was beginning to develop. Thompsons was involved in a crucial case at this time, which had a profound effect on the issue, in that employers had to consider their employees individually as well as following a general standard. Even today this is one of the leading cases in the field:
Paris v Stepney Borough Council (1951): Mr Paris was employed in the council’s garage as a fitter, and was known to have only one eye by his employers. At this time if was not general practice for employers to provide protective eyewear and, when Mr Paris was using a hammer to remove a metal bolt, a chip of metal flew into his good eye causing him to become totally blind.
It was eventually found that the employer owed a special duty of care to Mr Paris and provided protective eyewear, taking into account that they knew of the condition of his eyes, the likelihood of such an incident and the severity of the consequences that it would cause. This was a case that was won in court, lost at the Court of Appeal and eventually won again in the House of Lords. Interestingly, at this point in time, if Mr Paris had had sight in both eyes, it is likely his personal injury case would have been lost and no compensation would have been awarded. This case remains one of the leading cases in this field to this day.
John Summers & Sons Ltd v Frost (1955): The Factories Act 1937 included a section outlining that any dangerous parts of machinery should be guarded, as machinery was the largest cause of accidents in factories at the time and employees needed to be protected. The interpretation of this act was significant in the development of health and safety.
Mr Frost was using a power driven grinding machine when his thumb came into contact with the grindstone and he was injured. The House of Lords found in favour of Mr Frost, deciding that the duty of his employers was absolute and that there should have been guards on the dangerous parts of the machine to prevent such accidents at work, despite any effects that this may have on its use.
This was a landmark interpretation of the act and stood as a benchmark for both it and its later replacement in 1961. It helped to bring about changes in the safety of machinery and helped many workers. The legislation was eventually changed with the Provision and Use of Work Equipment Regulations 1998.
Bonnington Castings v Wardlaw (1956): This landmark industrial disease case handled by F.R. Oaten of Thompsons still forms an essential part of the law even today. Mr Wardlaw worked in a foundry where he was exposed to silica dust over a period of time and contracted Pneumoconiosis. The exposure was through using pneumatic hammers and swing grinders and, although there was no known way of preventing dust inhalation from the pneumatic hammers at the time, his employers had a statutory duty to use dust extractors for the swing grinders.
Therefore of the two sources of the dust that caused the damage, only one had been caused by the company’s negligence. The House of Lords decided that as the negligent source had contributed to Mr Wardlaw’s condition, his employer would be held liable to pay compensation, even though the proportion of exposure from each source could not be proved. This principle of contribution still has relevance in many industrial disease cases today.
The limitation act 1963 was passed as the result of the case Cartledge v E. Jopling & Sons Ltd, in which Mr Cartledge developed pneumoconiosis some years after working with noxious dust. However, his claim was rejected due to the case being brought more than three years after the damage was caused. The new act provided that the time did not begin to run until there was material knowledge that damage had been done. Several test cases followed, two of which, detailed below, were handled by Thompsons.
Pickles v National Coal Board (1968), Central Asbestos Co Ltd v Dodd (1972): In the Pickles case, Mr Pickles worked as a miner before leaving to work as a lathe operator. Around six years later he began to suffer chest trouble and was subsequently diagnosed with silicosis from his work underground. There was an delay in the issue of proceedings until more than 12 months after the diagnosis, however the court found in favour of Mr Pickles, as he had taken all reasonable action and the case was made within 12 months of the date he was advised he may have a legal claim.
In the Dodd case, Mr Dodd was exposed to asbestos through the fault of his employer and was diagnosed with an asbestos related disease. He was then awarded disablement benefit and left his position at the company. He did not realise at the time that he was entitled to make a compensation claim, only seeking legal advice two years later, in 1967, after learning that another workman was bringing a claim. The company contested his claim on the basis of the limitation period, however the House of Lords found in favour of Mr Dodd. This was on the basis that he did not have knowledge that he could make a legal claim against the employer until 1967.
As a result of these cases, workers who would have had their personal injury claims dismissed on the grounds that they were out of time, were successful in recovering compensation for their diseases. Another important issue in industrial disease cases is when a reasonable employer should have become aware of any health risk to which he was exposing his employees, and what steps should have been taken to avoid this. Once again, Thompsons were involved in an important leading case:
Wallhead v Ruston and Hornsby Ltd (1973): Mr Wallhead worked in a foundry from 1942 to 1949, until his employer set up a new foundry, and he then worked as a sand miller until 1964. He later brought a legal action as he had developed chronic bronchitis and emphysema.
The judge held that a reasonable employer should have been aware of the risks to employees from 1950 and, although the exposure after this date did not cause the illness, it did aggravate it and so compensation was payable. This case is still considered the leading case on constructive knowledge.